




\Vorking Paper No. 64/1994
'Brook Thomas
, .
Parts Related to Wholes and the
Nature of Subaltern Opposition
Copyright c 1994 by Brook Thomas
University of California, Irvine
•
Brook Thomas
Parts Related to Wholes and the Nature of Subaltern Opposition
The cultural critic is not happy with civilization, to which
alone he owes his discontent' - Theodor W. Adorno
The premise of this essay is that what we can call "a crisis
in representation" in literary studies since the late 1960s has
altered the way in which literary historians can do "cultural
criticism." A major symptom of that crisis is the breakdown of an
organic historicist model in which certain great texts were granted
the capacity synecdochally to represent the complexity of a culture
that produced them. As Lionel Trilling put it, "certain artists
. contain a large part of the dialectic [of their culture]
within themselves. ,,2 Within organic historicism sophisticated
literary history and criticism in itself became one version of
political and cultural criticism. For instance, Northrop Frye
could argue that the "tendency of critics to move from critical to
larger social issues" is a natural outgrowth of the "balance"
between criticism's two aspects, "one turned toward the structure
of literature as a whole and one toward other cultural phenomena
that form its environment.,,3
The breakdown of organic historicism has affected literary
critics intent on doing cultural criticism in a variety of ways.
Most obviously, it has forced them to come up with different ways
of relating literary texts to the cultures of which they are a
part. But it has also altered their sense of the relationship
among literary texts, the cultures that produced them, and the more
encompassing world of "nature" of which both texts and cultures are
apart. To simplify, one way in which organic historicists granted
literary texts their representative capacity was to emphasize their
use of symbolic language, which established a complicated and yet
interconnected relationship between language and what it
represented. For most literary critics doing cultural criticism
today that relationship is no longer a natural, organic one but an
arbitrary, socially-constructed one. In addition, the breakdown of
organic historicism has posed achallenge to the metaphor of the
body politic and how individuals and groups relate to the political
entity of which they are apart. That challenge is especially
apparent in debates in the united states over how multiculturalism
affects the ideal of ~ Pluribus Unum.
In this essay I argue that, despite the breakdown of an
organicist model, the relation of parts to wholes should remain an
important focus of study. I also offer an alternative to
synecdoche as a way of formulating that relation. My alternative
is what classical logicians call "subaltern opposition." It by no
means solves all of the problems of contemporary cultural
criticism. Nonetheless, by describing more accurately some of the
situations contributing to our current crisis in representation, it
helps to clarify some of the confusions resulting from efforts to
find alternatives to the model of organic historicism.
I
As a way of illustrating how attention to the relation between
parts and wholes can give us insight into the problematics of
representation in the political as weIl as aesthetic sense, 1'11
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start by juxtaposing two passagrs from a literary text written
during a previous crisis of representation in the united states:
Moby-Dick. A crucial question facing the country at the time that
Melville wrote Moby-Dick was how individual states would relate to
the federal government, a question drawing heightened attention to
the questions of just who "the people" were that constituted the
union and whether all of them were being represented by it. In
terms of these questions of representation, Moby-Dick suggests that
the figure for an ideal democracy is synecdoche, in which each part
has the capacity to stand for or represent the whole. There are
few better expressions of the synecdochal ideal of democracy than
Ishmael' s celebration of "that democratic dignity which, on all
hands, radiates without end from God, Himself! The great God
absolute! The center and circumference of all democracy! His
omnipresence, our divine equality.,,4 Democracy in the ideal is a
perfect organic union in which each part can express the "just
Spirit of Equality" (MD 105) that both serves as Ishmael's muse and
offers divine sanction to the American experiment.
Nonetheless, the ideal image presented in the first of the
"Knights and Squires" chapters is supplemented in the second
chapter of that name by a very different description of how the
isolatoes making up the crew of the Peguod are actually federated.
To be sure, in his description Ishmael evokes an image of a shared,
democratic humanity with his metaphor of the "common continent of
man" (MD 108). But he does so only to insist that the Peguod's
Anacharsis Clootz deputation does not acknowledge that commonality.
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It is not united by a shared identity because each isolato lives on
a "separate continent of his own" (MD 108). These isolatoes are
unified through an act of federation, one that establishes
relationships of subordination.
This subordination first of all evokes the relationship of
individual states to the Federal government -- a relationship hotly
contested in 1850. Second, it makes clear that unity aboard the
Pequod is achieved at the cost of a hierarchical order, which is at
odds with the democratic ideal in which parts can speak for the
whole. Not synecdochal, the relation between parts and wholes can
productively be described as subaltern.
The term "subaltern" is widely used today in literary and
cultural studies to describe present or former subjects of
colonialism. Indeed, "subaltern studies" has become the name of a
separate field of study and a journal. "Subaltern" can also refer
to someone of subordinate rank in the military. Both of these
meanings can be applied to the hierarchical order on board the
Pequod, in which colonial sUbjects acting as harpooners are placed
in control of mates who, as in a military unit, occupy subordinate
positions in relation to their captain. When I use "subaltern" to
describe the representational relation between parts and wholes,
however, I draw on its meaning in classical logic, a meaning that
most likely led to the other two.
In order to chart immediate inferences that can be drawn from
the affirmation or denial of single categorical premises, medieval




propositions contradict one another, are contrary to one another,
subcontrary to one another or exist in subaltern opposition.
Contradictory and contrary oppositions are familiare A subaltern
one is not. Subaltern opposition involves the relation of a
particular to a universal of which it is apart. A particular
exists in a subaltern relation to a universal because the truth of
the universal governs its truth whereas the particular's truth does.
not govern the truth of the universal. For instance, the statement
"Some men are mortal beings" is subaltern to the statement "All men
are mortal beings" because, if the latter is true, the former must
be, whereas the truth of the former does not guarantee the truth of
the latter.
All men are morlal beings. Contrarie. No men are morlal beings.
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Some men are not mortalSome men are mortal beings. Subcontrarie. beings.
The subaltern nature of the relationship on board the Peguod
signals a crisis in representation because, if in the democratic
ideal of synecdoche parts can speak for the whole, by definition a
subaltern cannot represent the whole of which it 1s apart.
In what follows.I will look at how the subaltern can provide
insight into our present crisis in representation. My point is not
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that all relations are subaltern ones. I do, however, argue that
it is important to recognize them when they exist, for a relation
of sUbalternity establishes certain limits that need to be taken
into account. Nonetheless, within those limits there is a range of
possibilities that also need to be acknowledged. I will look at
both the limits and possibilities of subaltern opposition in terms
of (1) literary texts' relation to the cultures of which they are
apart, (2) the relationship between "cultural constructs" and
"natural givens," and (3) the relationship of political subjects to
the sovereign powers that govern them.
My sense of the possibilities allowed by subaltern opposition
is deeply indebted to a brief passage in Jacques Derrida's
Grammatology that describes the "logic of the supplement." The
"logic of the supplement" is important to my argument because it
complicates the dialectic logic that governs relations of
contradiction. Based on a principle of identity, contradiction
assumes that a thing cannot at the same time and in the same
respect be and not be. Thus if one proposition is true, its
contradictory proposition must be false. According to the logic of
dialectic, contradiction can be overcome only through an Aufhebung
in which a synthesis incorporates the identities of the opposed
entities.
The logic of the supplement challenges dialectical logic, by
calling into question the principle of identity on which
contradiction is based. Whereas dialectical logic assumes the
separate identity of entities in relations of contradiction, the
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logic of the supplement implies that, because the identity of
contradictory entities is defined in part by that which it opposes,
what seem to be mutually exclusive identities are in fact mutually
dependent ones. An entity is defined not only by what it is, but
also by what it is not. The supreme example of this supplementary
logic is writing, which cannot be writing unless the material signs
that constitute it represent something that it is not.
Discussing the logic of the supplement in a chapter on
Rousseau, Derrida argues that writing becomes a "dangerous
supplement" the moment when it, as representation, "claims to be
presence and the sign in itself"; that is, when we forget that it
is not the thing that it represents but only its supplement. This
dangerous claim to presence is always present because "the concept
of the supplement . . . harbors within itself two significations
whose cohabitation is as strange as it is necessary." On the one
hand, the supplement is an addition to an already existing
plentitude. It merely represents that which is sufficient in
itself. On the other hand, Derrida adds, supplementation is
necessary because of a lack in that which it represents. In this
sense it is not an addition but a substitution.
It adds only to replace. It intervenes or insinuates itself
in-the-place-of; if it fills, it is as if one fills a void.
If it represents and makes an image, it is by the anterior
default of apresence. Compensatory [suppleant] and
vicarious, the supplement is an adjunct, a subaltern instance
which takes-(thel-place [tient-lieu]. As substitute, it is
7
not simply added to the positivity of presence, it produces no
relief, its place is assigned in the structure by the mark of
an emptiness. Somewhere, something can be filled up of
itself, can accomplish itself, only by allowing itself to be
filled through sign and proxy. The sign is always the
supplement of the thing itself. 5
Crucial for the purposes of my essay is Derrida's designation
of the supplement as "a subaltern instance." Rather than follow
the logic of dialectical opposition, the supplement seems to follow
that of subaltern opposition. Nonetheless, it is subaltern
opposition with a difference, for, if on the square of oppositions
the subaltern cannot by definition represent the whole of which it
is a part, in Derrida's description of the supplement the subaltern
substitutes for or takes the place of the whole that governs it.
This act of supplementation is necessary because the whole -- in
this case Nature -- despite its claim to self-sufficiency, cannot
re-present itself. Its representation requires an act of
supplementation, an act implying that rather than achieve the
fullness of presence Nature is constituted by a lack. If the
subaltern's act of supplementation promises to fill that lack, its
existence as a subaltern implies that its attempted representation
is bound to fail.
This failure opens up possibilities for subaltern opposition.
Although a subaltern by definition cannot achieve the synecdochal
ideal of representing the whole of which it is apart, the logic of
the supplement implies that the whole, nonetheless, depends upon a
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subaltern to represent i t. That dependency results from the
whole's inability to achieve the self-contained, self-sufficiency
that it promises. Not a self-contained, self-sufficient entity,
the whole is at least potentially prone to transformation by the
subalternal efforts to represent it, even if those efforts are by
necessity failures. Both that transformative potential and that
failure are important in measuring the contribution that the
subaltern can make to current debates about the relationship of
literary texts to the cultures of which they are apart.
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The sometimes tiresome debate over which texts truly represent
a culture and which ones are in opposition to a culture's
repressive forces is at least in part a response to the breakdown
of the organic historicist model. According to that model certain
great texts had the paradoxical power to be both representative and
oppositional. That power resulted from their synecdochal
symbolism. As we have seen, their representative capacity was
linked to a complexity that synecdochally represented the
dialectical tensions of the culture that produced them. Their
oppositional capacity derived from a symbolism that, not only
represented those tensions, but balanced them in a way that no
other discourse was able to do. If in historical actuality a
culture is ruled by a particular group employing a particular
discourse that speaks for some interests at the expense of others,
a great text opposed that dominant discourse (indeed, any discourse
speaking for a particular interest) not because it was outside of
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a culture or uncontaminated by i ts particular discourses but
because in balancing them it transcended them through a symbolic
unity that served as a literary counterpart to a philosophical
Aufhebung.
An attribute of organic historicism in general, this
transcendental aspect of selected texts was particularly important
in the literary history of the united states where a federal system
of government promised to provide the means to transcend the
particular, factional interests of the parts making up the national
whole. To be sure, as Madison argues in the 10th Federalist Paper,
any such transcendence of factional interest had to be anchored in
concrete political institutions. Nonetheless, even for the
politically pragmatic Madison the most important institution was
one involving an act of representation, one assuming that locally
elected representatives to national office had a responsibility to
represent the interests of the entire people, not just those who
elected them. In others words, in Madison's theory of
representation ~ Pluribus Unum is possible only if we assume a
transcendental common interest of "the people" that is not
necessarily the result of interest-driven politics. If that united
interest remained an ideal for Madison, it found concrete
embodiment for critics like F. o. Matthiessen in great works of
literature, works that opposed the tendency of the culture to stray
from its democratic mission.
Of the variety of responses to the breakdown of this textual
model of organic historicism, I want to focus on two that, although
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often at odds, share numerous assumptions. One response attacks
the existing canon for representing a white, male cultural elite.
Reminding us that synecdoche fulfills its democratic promise only
if all parts are granted the capacity to speak for the whole,
critics of the canon have pointed out that, no matter how
egalitarian organic historicists might have claimed to be
politically, they selected a canon that was not truly
representative. As a result, such critics insist on the right of
works by women and minorities to be representative, especially
representative of assumptions opposed to the "dominant" culture.
A second response argues that no work can oppose the culture of
which it is apart, including those of minorities and women.?
Despite their differences, both responses challenge
Matthiessen's model by denying the ability of any text to transcend
interest politics. Indeed, for both texts inevitably represent a
particular set of interests. Their disagreement is over what
interests they represent. Eschewing complexity, various advocates
of "marginalized" texts measure the value of a work by its ability
to represent the political interests of a particular group opposed
to the dominant culture. still fascinated by complexity, advocates
of what we can call "the containment thesis" use texts to
demonstrate the complex way in which the interaction among various
groups serves the interests of "culture as a whole" whose most
subtle move is to contain even those who would claim to oppose it.
At issue, then, is what constitutes the "dominant" culture.
For the former, a group's oppressed status signals its
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position outside the dominant culture. For the latter, even
oppressed groups are connected to that which oppresses them,
forming a vital part of its "logic" of domination. But despite
this disagreement, both continue to assume that a text can
represent the culture that produces it however that culture is
defined. It cannot, however, oppose it. Assuming that subaltern
opposition is impossible, both operate as if opposition is possible
only when an entity is outside of that which it opposes.
Derrida's discussion of the supplement offers an alternative
to this dialectical notion of opposition by suggesting the
possibility that a text can oppose the very culture of which it is
apart. To be sure, as we have seen, organic historicists granted
texts that same paradoxical power, but only by granting them a
quasi-mystical capacity symbolically to represent the higher
interests of a culture. In contrast, the supplementary logic of
the subaltern comes into play only when no transcendental whole
exists. Texts may be governed by the culture that produces them,
but because no culture is a self-contained, self-sufficient entity,
it cannot totally determine all of their possibilities. Indeed,
incapable of self-representation, a cultural whole depends upon
various texts for its representation. But whereas canon busters
and advocates of the containment thesis grant various texts the
capacity to represent the culture that produces them, whether it be
the dominant, "white, male" culture, the local culture of an
oppressed group, or the interwoven culture of dominant and
oppressed alike, Derrida's logic of the supplement implies that no
12
part will ever fully represent the whole. That representational
discrepancy creates the conditions for subaltern opposition, an
opposition that gives a text the potential -- not necessarily
activated -- to transform our sense of the culture of which it is
apart.
My warning that the transformative potential of a "subaltern"
text is not necessarily activated is areminder that a text is by
no means automatically transformative. Indeed, most are not. My
general description of subaltern opposition does little to help
account for the complex interaction of a set of concrete historical
circumstances and concrete textual attributes that allow some to be
transformative and others not. Nonetheless, it is not without
consequences, for it guards against closing off possibilities about
a text's relation to the culture of which it is apart. Precisely
because no text, no matter who wrote it, can fully represent a
culture, any text is potentially "oppositional." The only way to
test whether one is or not is through a close reading of it in
_conjunction with the culture of which it is apart, however that
culture is defined.
There are, I need to acknowledge, more and more such readings.
Nonetheless, the formulations accounting for the "cultural work" of
texts quite often give a misleading description of the relationship
between them and the culture of which they are apart. This is
especially the case when cultural critics rely on the figure of
chiasmus. Stephen Greenblatt, for instance, cites with approval
Louis Montrose's claim that AMidsummer Night's Dream "creates the
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culture by which it is created, shapes the fantasies by which it is
shaped, begets that by which it is begotten."a similar chiastic
formulations are Montrose' s "the historicity of texts and the
textuality of history,,,9 Greenblatt's "the social dimension of an
aesthetic strategy and the aesthetic dimension of a social
strategy, ,,10 and Sacvan Bercovitch' s attempt "to see how culture
empowers symbolic form. . and how symbols participate in the
dynamics of culture. ,,11
What all of these formulations forget is that the relationship
between a particular text and the culture of which it is apart is
subaltern, not chiastic. Unlike subaltern opposition, which
relates parts to a whole, chiasmus relates parts to parts. To
relate a text or even the entire realm of the aesthetic to culture
chiastically is unwittingly to grant both texts and the aesthetic
too much independence by ignoring the fact that both are part of a
larger entity that we call culture. To be sure, part of chiasmus'
popularity today is that it enacts a dependency between two
entities that would seem to be opposed to one another. But as
appropriate as chiasmus is to describe certain relations, it is not
appropriate to describe the relationship between texts and the
culture of which they are apart. Much more appropriate is that of
subaltern opposition, especially when linked to Derrida's logic of
the supplement, for it allows for the paradoxical possibility that
something can be apart of a larger entity without being totally
contained by it. The subaltern also proves useful in defining
limits and suggesting possibilities regarding a human culture's
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relation to something larger than itself, something which (for lack
of a better term) we call "nature," something against which many
cultural critics define their work.
111
Derrida' s discussion of the supplement grows out of his
analysis of the dilemma that Rousseau faces in representing
"Nature. " In that discussion he describes the supplement as a
"subaltern instance" that takes the place of that which it would
represent. In the United states, however, the link between the
logic of the supplement and the subaltern has, for the most part,
been neglected in favor of descriptions relying on chiasmus. 12
Perhaps the most influential one is Barbara Johnson' s in her
translator's introduction to the appropriately titled
Disseminations.
Intent on demonstrating the challenge that the logic of the
supplement poses to dialectical logic, Johnson links domination to
the structure of opposition itself, arguing that hierarchical
relations in the West result from a set of binary oppositions that
privilege categories prornising the presence of self-representation
and self-sufficiency over corresponding categories defined by an
absence. Using Derrida's discussion of the supplement to
demonstrate that the identity of the privileged category is
dependent upon, indeed inhabited by, the very category that it
claims to oppose, Johnson calls into question the notion of a
separate identity upon which the oppositional structure of
dialectic depends. As Johnson puts it, "What Derrida's reading of
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Rousseau's text sketches out is indeed nothing less than a
revolution in the very logic of meaning. The logic of the
supplement wrenches apart the neatness of the metaphysical binary
oppositions. Instead of 'A is opposed to B' we have 'B is both
added to A and replaces A.' A and Bare no longer opposed, nor are
they equivalent. Indeed, they are no longer even equivalent to
themselves. They are their own difference from themselves.,,13
Cautioning that the dominations supported by such oppositional
structures can be dismantled only through concrete readings,
Johnson advocates a strategy of supplementary reading that places
opposing entities in chiastic relation to one another. The point
is not simply to reverse hierarchies, which would merely reinscribe
the oppositional structure of dialectic. It is, instead, to set in
motion a destabilizing play of difference that forces us to
recognize the arbitrariness of hierarchical relations that many in
the culture assume to be a product of nature. Such readings,
according to Johnson, are a "critique" that "reads backwards from
what seems natural, obvious, self-evident, or universal, in order
to show that these things have their histories, their reasons for
being the way that they are, their effects on what follows from
them, and that the starting point is not a (natural) given but a
(cultural) construct, usually blind to itself. ,,14
By calling supplementary readings critiques that reveal how
structures of domination are cultural constructs, not natural
givens, Johnson links deconstruction to a tradition of ideological
demystification powerfully articulated by Roland Barthes in
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Mythologies. According to Barthes, bourgeois ideology is "the
process through which the bourgeoisie transforms the reality of the
world into an image of the world, History into Nature." Barthes
himself cites Karl Marx in The German Ideology," . we must pay
attention to history , since ideology boils down to either an
erroneous conception of history, or to a complete abstraction from
it.,,15 But although Johnson links deconstruction to this tradition,
she believes that the logic of the supplement "supplements" it in
a very important way by challenging the dialectical logic on which
it is based. Indeed, although today's cultural critics have
sometimes been put off by Johnson' s deconstructive emphasis on
"textuality," many are directly or indirectly indebted to her, for
never have so many assumed that domination results from the
perpetuation of a set of hierarchical binary oppositions.
My problem with Johnson's account, as lucid and powerful as it
is, is her exclusive focus on binary oppositions as a source of
domination. That focus causes her to confine herself to
relationships between parts and parts while ignoring those between
parts and wholes. Or to refer to the square of oppositions,
although she is intent on "deconstructing" the dialectical logic of
contradiction, she remains fixated on relations of contradiction
while ignoring those of sUbalternity. But certainly any account of
domination that does not deal with the way in which parts are
governed by wholes is seriously flawed. One resul t is an
inadequate account of domination within the political and social
spheres, a point that I will come back to in the next section.
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Another result is a tendency to offer a reified account of the
relationship between culture and nature.
The opposition that Johnson makes between a "(natural) given"
and a "(cultural) construct," is a crucial one for a generation of
cultural critics. By demonstrating that something previously
thought to be an unal terable product of nature is in fact a
construct of culture with a history , numerous cultural critics
claim to emancipate us from the restrictions of a false ideology
and thus open up new possibilities for human life. As the legal
scholar J .M. Balkin puts it in terms of deconstruction, "By
challenging what is 'given,' deconstruction affirms the infinite
possibilities of human existence. By contesting 'necessity,'
deconstruction dissolves the ideological encrustations of our
thought. ,,16 But if the task of a deconstructive reading is to
destabilize binary oppositions, it is noteworthy that the enabling
move of many cultural critics depends upon positing one between
nature and culture. 17 At stake is a naive view of both.
Despite their emancipatory efforts, cultural critics who
oppose nature to culture have not freed themselves from making
assumptions about nature. On the contrary, they make a particular
claim about nature. If hierarchical relations are, as argued, the
result of convention, not nature, then it follows that nature lacks
hierarchies. But such an egalitarian view of nature has a very
specific history. It is not at all self-evident, as the doctrine
of the divine right of kings or Callicles's argument in Plato's
Gorgias demonstrates.
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To avoid misunderstanding, let me make perfectly clear that
insofar as nature has been appealed to to justify the repressed
status of women or various minorities, the argument that these
repressions are the product of human history, not nature, has an
immediate and local emancipatory effect. But it has by no means
affirmed "the infinite possibilities of human existence." It has
simply -- which is quite a bit -- made the case that these groups
should have the same rights and opportunities as others. But even
when that argument is successful, it has not freed those groups any
more than others from material limitations imposed on all beings
"in nature" such as the law of gravity or various chemical
reactions involving oxygen. As W.E.B. DuBois puts it, there is a
"natural realm of dictatorship to which all government must bOWi
that is, the physical laws governing the constitution of materials,
the application of natural force, and the availability of certain
techniques in using matter and force, which are all subject to law
and cannot be changed by popular vote. ,,18
To make the materialist argument that the possibilities of
human existence are limited by certain conditions of the physical
environment in which people live may be stating the obvious, but to
make it is to play havoc with the effort to oppose culture to
nature. The two are, to paraphrase Johnson, neither opposed nor
equivalent. And yet their relation does not lend itself to
chiasmatic reversals in the same way that other common oppositions
do. Because men and women are subsets of the category human
beings, it makes perfeet sense to destabilize the hierarchical
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opposition generating, for instance, the Biblical myth that women
derive from men. But it is an argument of a different kind to
argue that nature and culture are on an equal footing. This is
because culture is a subset of nature, not vice versa, which is
another way of saying that culture exists in a subaltern relation
to nature. Indeed, in formal logic another use of the term
"subaltern" is in the division of categories. Thus, an entity that
is a subset of another is said to be in a subaltern relation to the
more inclusive entity.
I know that in evoking the term "nature" I invite immediate
protests because it is so difficult to define and so ideologically
weighted. Nonetheless, I continue to use the term for the same
reason that many cultural critics use it. It is a word that we use
to designate an entity that is not purely a cultural construct.
But whereas they use it in dialectical opposition to culture,
implying that it has a bounded, self-contained identity, I argue
that culture exists in a relation of subaltern opposition to it of
the sort implied by Derrida's description of the supplement.
Governing culture, but depending upon cultural forms of discourse
for its representation, nature cannot be adequately described or
defined because it is not a bounded, self-contained entity. To
emphasize the importance of thinking of the opposition between
nature and culture subalternally rather than dialectically, I can
once again draw an example from Moby-Dick.
Ahab's mistake in Moby-Dick is to assume that he, as a human
being, can be on equal footing with nature so as to oppose it
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dialectically. In fact, he not only tries to establish an equal
footing with nature, he tries to reverse hierarchies and place
hirnself in control of that which previously controlled hirn. Like
many cultural critics, Ahab denies the limitations imposed by
nature. For hirn there is no whole that governs the parts of the
world, including humanity. "Who's over me?" he asks. "Truth hath
no confines" (MD 144).
Ahab's final failure to dominate the whale suggests that, far
from emancipatory, the dialectical opposition between human culture
and nature can lead to dire cultural consequences. It even raises
the possibility that human beings are totally determined by a
nature over which they have no control. But there is ample
evidence in the book indicating that human beings do have the power
to control and even destroy parts of nature. Enhanced by
technological advances made available by Western cultures, that
power has a transformative effect on nature. It does not, however,
grant human beings the power of dialectical opposition. Part of
the very entity that they oppose, human beings can transform nature
by dominating other parts of a complicated ecological web not the
whole itself. Indeed, humanity's power to alter that web
undermines the notion of an ahistorical transcendental Nature that
can be dialectically opposed to a contingent world of history, for
in such a world nature itself has a history. Its history is not,
however, completely determined by humanity. As we have seen, the
subaltern can transform the whole of which it is apart without
governing i t. Indeed, humanity' s subaltern relation to nature
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suggests that history's contingency is influenced by its relation
to achanging nature, just as nature's contingency is influenced by
its relation to achanging history.
To stress humanity's subaltern relation to nature is by no
means to deny the importance of cultural criticism. It is,
however, to warn against a cultural criticism that draws i ts
emancipatory thrust from a dialectical opposition between culture
and nature, for, as Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer have argued,
that opposition is prone to lead to more subtle forms of
oppression, not emancipation. 19 At the same time, humanity's
subaltern relation to nature also warns against an ahistorical
tendency in some ecocriticism that defines Nature against culture
as a way of granting to Nature a transcendental permanency violated
by any human contact. In contrast, humanity's subaltern relation
to nature implies that, insofar as Aristotle is correct in defining
politics as the "art of the possible," no humanly-constructed
political system can ignore the constraints placed upon it by
nature, at the same time that those systems' political
responsibilities should not be defined solely by their effect on
human culture.
The interconnections between the realms of culture and nature
do not mean, however, that the two become identical. 20 For
instance, the subaltern relation between human culture and nature
is not the same as the one between political sUbjects and the
sovereign power that governs them. A crucial difference is that
culture's subaltern relation to nature is not negotiable. The
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relationships between political subjects and sovereign powers are
in this limited sense more complicated. After all, there are
various political systems that exist in various relations to one
another. People who are subj ect to one are rarely subj ect to
another, meaning that someone who exists in a subaltern relation to
one political entity usually has a quite different relation to
others. Thus, the subaltern is not universally appl icable in
describing political relations.
Furthermore , the subaltern provides no help in answering
numerous political questions of extreme importance, such as: Who
decides the boundaries of a particular entity constituting a
sovereign whole, or Whether a particular entity has a right to
exist or not. Nonetheless, the logical category of the subaltern
does help to define certain limitations and suggest certain
possibilities about the way in which subjects relate to the
political whole of which they are apart. It is to a specific set
of such limitations and possibilities that I now want to turn.
IV
I mentioned in the last section that any account of cultural
domination that focusses exclusively on the relation of parts to
parts and the binary oppositions constructed among those parts is
limited. My point was not that such an account is false, but that
it needs to be supplemented by one that also examines the
relationship of parts to wholes. This supplementation is
especially important for an understanding of a pluralistic society,
like the united states. For instance, Alice Kessler-Harris, a
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recent president of the American Studies Association, praises "the
multicultural enterprise" for providing "a way of seeing
relationally. ,,21 But to understand the structures of domination in
our society we cannot confine ourselves to looking at how, say,
Chinese-Americans relate to other groups. We cannot because their
position in society is also determined by their relation to the
totality of those groups, a totality of which they are apart.
To insist on the need to relate parts to wholes as weIl as
parts to parts is not to deny the power that one group can have
over others. For instance, the power that white males have had
over other groups in American society is one reason why the
metaphor of the melting pot, which synecdochally promises to relate
parts to a whole, is under attack. One problem with it is that it
is historically inaccurate. As the late Thurgood Marshall bluntly
put it, "The dream of America as the great melting pot has not been
realized for the Negroi because of his skin color he never even
made i t into the pot. ,,22 A maj or reason that the dream of the
melting pot has not been realized is that for a substantial period
of the country's history those with the political power to
represent the country as a whole were white males. Indeed, the
assumed definition of an American was white. As we have seen,
synecdoche's potential as the figure for democracy fails, if only
one part is allowed to speak for the whole.
It is for these reasens and ethers that Kessler-Harris defends
multiculturalism for refusing "to acknowledge a stable meaning or
precise unchanging definition of America" (CL 311). Nonetheless,
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as Kessler-Harris implies when she positively evokes "that unified
whole called America" (CL 311) and its traditional "search for
unity, identity, and purpose" (CL 311), a part's relation to a
whole need not be simply one leading to domination. It can also
create conditions of possibility.
In this section I ~ill show how the logical category of the
subaltern can help to articulate various advantages of being a
political subject in a modern liberal, democratic Rechtsstaad at
the same time that it allows for criticism of such systems by
drawing attention to relations of domination. My description of
such subjects takes issue with various forms of ideological
criticism that have a tendency to universalize what it means to be
a political subject. Indeed, if an enabling move for cultural
critics intent on emancipating us from structures of domination has
been to oppose culture to nature, an enabling move for those intent
on describing conditions of domination has been to insist that all
individual subjects are ideological subjects.
An influential essay in this regard is Louis Althusser's
"Ideology and Ideological state Apparatuses (Notes towards an
Investigation) ." Arguing that there is no position outside of
ideology, Althusser declares that "ideology has no history ." Quiek
to add, "ideologies have g history of their own," he, nonetheless,
goes on to describe the structural form by which "ideology hails or
interpellates individuals as subjects," a form "making it clear
that individuals are always-already interpellated by ideology as
subjects, which necessarily leads us to one last proposition:
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individuals are always-already subj ects. ,,23
One of the strengths of Althusser's essay is that, like the
work of Gramsci, it insists that ideology should not be confined to
the realm of traditional politics. Indeed, Althusser significantly
revises the traditional marxist model of a material economic base
and an ideological super structure. For hirn the ideology that
interpellates individuals as subjects is manifested in the material
practices of an entire society including social institutions like
the church, the family, the educational system, and cultural
discourses. For literary critics, who after all are usually not
trained in political science, this more inclusive notion of
ideology is extremely attractive. Mediated by the work of Michel
Foucault and Clifford Geertz, it has allowed those offering "thick
descriptions" of "culture" to practice "political" criticism
without paying attention to traditional political issues. 24 For
instance, Catherine Gallagher argues that "power cannot be equated
with economic or state power, that its sites of activity, and hence
resistance, are also in the micro-politics of daily life. The
traditional important economic and political agents and events have
been displaced or supplemented by people and phenomena that once
seemed wholly insignificant, indeed outside of history: women,
criminals, the insane, sexual practices, and discourses, fairs,
festivals, plays of all kinds. ,,25
I can agree with almost all that Gallagher says and still
worry about a slippage in her description of the type of analysis
that she advocates. Traditional economic and political analysis
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certainly needs to be "supplemented" by analysis of the "micro-
politics of daily life," which is one reason why Trilling feIt that
his essays in literary criticism had political implications. But
when it is "displaced" by it, we risk discounting the role pIayed
by particular economic and political systems in the construction of
"political" subjects, something Trilling would never have done. To
be sure, Althusser himself does not advocate such a displacement,
but by describing the structure by which ideology hails subjects
without detailing how the relations of subjects to the political
system of which they are apart vary from system to system, he
opens the door for the type of criticism that acts as if such
analysis is irrelevant.
The logical category of the subaltern can help demonstrate
that such analysis remains important. To be sure, it cannot simply
displace the thick descriptions of the micro-politics of daily life
that have characterized the work of recent literary critics turning
to the analysis of "cultural politics." It can, however,
supplement it in important ways by reminding us that the
possibilities for political agency especially the agency of
subaltern subjects -- depend, at least in part, on the type of
political system governing the society of which they are apart.
I can illustrate my point through abrief historical
comparison. Althusser's argument that "ideology has no history"
can -- though not necessarily -- have an effect similar -- though
not identical -- to the argument made by pro-slavery Southerners
prior to the civil War. Making no claim that under their system
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slaves were free, they argued, nonetheless, that the "wage slaves"
working in Northern factories weren't either. Similarly, in the
context of Cold War polemics Althusser's argument served to
undercut claims in the West about the "freedom" of citizens under
democratic rule.
As important as i tremains to point out the ideological
control exerted in even the most democratic of existing political
systems, the potential danger of not making distinctions among the
individual histories of particular ideologies and the limitations
and possibilities of subjects under particular systems is suggested
by pro-slavery arguments. As worthy of criticism' as the
exploitative "free" labor system of the North was, to call Northern
workers slaves was to minimize the horrors of slavery. Whereas
some of those horrors can be detailed by traditional economic
analysis, others are revealed by focussing on the different status
that Northern workers and Southern slaves had as political
subj ects. The logical category of the subaltern can help to define
that difference.
Like the crew on the Pequod, Northern workers were subaltern
sUbjects. They may occupy subordinate positions, but they are at
least considered apart of the whole. In contrast, slaves were not
even granted the status of citizens. Not considered apart of the
whole that governed them, they were dominated by an entity
supposedly different in kind from them. As a result, as Hegel
demonstrates, the master/slave relation is determined by
contradictory , not subaltern, opposition. The only hope the slaves
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had for transforming the system that enslaved them was dialectical
confrontation. Subalterns, depending on the nature of the whole
governing them, have different options.
with the demise of institutionalized slavery, it might seem
unnecessary to make a distinction between subalterns and slaves.
Nonetheless, confusion between the two persists, even in the work
of Homi K. Bhabba, one of the best critics in the field of
subaltern studies. Noticing Derrida's use of "subaltern" in the
passage that I have quoted and drawing on it to describe the
possibilities of subaltern agency, Bhabba confuses the subaltern
with the slave, such as when he speaks of "the diametrically
opposed world views of master and slave which between them account
for the maj or historical and philosophical dialectic of modern
times." To be sure, what I call Bhabba's "confusion" results in
part because he is using "subaltern" to describe colonial and post-
colonial sUbjects, not as a category from classical logic. But if
he is going to evoke Derrida's logic of the supplement, he needs to
pay attention to the logical use of the term, especially since he
is intent on disrupting the "dialectic process" of transcendental
totalization. 26 Unaware of the category of subaltern opposition,
he attempts that disruption -- as does Johnson -- by staying solely
within the language of contradiction. The point is not that the
language of contradiction should never be used. There are numerous
times when it is appropriate. But to stay lodged solely within it
is to give inadequate descriptions of possibilities for both
opposition and domination.
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To come up with more precise descriptions of those
possibilities we need to make distinctions not only between
dialectical and subaltern oppositions but among different positions
occupied by subaltern sUbjects in relation to a political whole.
Evoking the logical meaning of the term, we can describe all people
recognized as belonging to a political body as subaltern sUbjects.
But the conditions of such sUbjects can vary widely. For instance,
in the early years of the twentieth century in the United states,
if white male citizens had full political rights, all female
citizens were explicitly denied various political rights while
African-American female citizens were also denied various social
rights by Jim Crow laws as were African-American male citizens who
at least had de jure, if not de facto, full political rights.
Native Americans lived under different political conditions, as did
various groups of Chicanos and Asian-Americans in various states.
As the distinction between de jure and de facta political
rights for African-American male citizens indicates, descriptions
of the micro-politics of everyday life are extremely important, but
so too are accurate descriptions of relations that different groups
have to the sovereign power(s) that govern them. For example, as
limited as the political power of African-Americans was, it was
greater than that of most colonial sUbjectsi that is, the subaltern
subjects of subaltern studies. Indeed, when the Spanish-American
War placed such subjects under the control of the united states,
the violent sUbjection of Filipinos caused South Carolina's Senator
Tillman to mock the Republican-led policy of imperialism with,
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"Republican leaders do no longer dare to call into question the
justice or the necessity of limiting negro suffrage in the South
. . . Your slogans of the past -- brotherhood of man and fatherhood
of God -- have gone glimmering down through the ages! ,,27 Similarly,
as restricted as the possibilities were for Asian-Americans, they
had a greater chance of transforming their conditions within the
existing political system than some of their relatives who lived
and worked in the united states but who had no chance of officially
becoming apart of the body politic and thus had to appeal for
protection to treaties negotiated between their home countries and
the united states, treaties that tended to favor Japanese aliens
over Chinese because of the respective powers of the two countries.
One reason why the analysis of what Gallagher terms
"traditional" "political agents" has lost favor with many of
today's cultural critics is that, although the disparity among the
political and civil rights granted to various groups of united
States citizens has been greatly minimized, structures of
domination persist. Their persistence calls out for the sort of
analysis advocated by Gallagher as weIl as, I might add, for
traditional economic analysis. But as we conduct such analysis we
should not take for granted the conditions of traditional political
agency that exist in the sort of representational democracy that
reigns in the united states.
As I suggested at the start of this essay, the crisis in
representation experienced in current literary studies in the West
is related to the discrepancy that so many feel in liberal
31
democracies between the promise of full political representation
and the continued existence of structures of hierarchical
domination. That discrepancy suggests that the promise of full
political representation might be the most subtle form of
ideological control. As Sacvan Bercovitch has argued, the
"ideology of America" holds out the promise of complete democracy,
which because its realization is perpetually deferred, serves to
provoke "rites of assent" that channel the allegiance and energies
of its citizens to bring about its fulfillment. But even
Bercovitch insists that such an ideology is not simply a strategy
of containment, since it also creates conditions for perpetual
transformation. 28
To articulate this paradox in the terms that I have used in
this essay, within the democratic system of the united states
political subjects exist in conditions of subalternity, a condition
that makes it impossible for any part fully to represent the whole.
Nonetheless, the promise that each part can synecdochally speak for
the whole is not simply a form of ideological control, because it
also creates the conditions by which subaltern opposition has the
potential to transform the whole. 29 In other words, the discrepancy
between the synecdochal promise of full representation and the
actuality of subaltern conditions, which marks the whole as a force
of oppression, also opens up transformative possibilities by
helping to work against what Kessler-Harris calls, "a stable
meaning or precise unchanging definition of America." Not a self-
contained, unchanging entity, the whole governing the parts relates
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to them in the way that Derrida describes the "subaltern instance"
of the supplement. Never fully represented by its subaltern parts,
yet relying on them for representation, the political body is
potentially transformed by acts of subaltern opposition, acts by
which previously unrepresented parts put themselves forward as
representative.
I can stress how a system' s synecdochal promise of full
representation can affect the possibilities for subaltern agency by
drawing on one more example from the works of Melville: Captain
Vere's defense of an authoritative political system. Adefender of
monarchy, Vere does not advocate a democratic organicism that
celebrates the possibility of political self-authorization by
holding out the promise that all parts can speak for the whole.
Instead, he adopts an authoritarian organicism in which an already
existing whole speaks through its parts. Vere's authoritarianism
does not rule out the possibility of opposition, only subaltern
opposition. In fact, convinced that any act of self-assertion
could disrupt the formal order necessary for the maintenance of
civilization, Vere is obsessed with the ever-present danger of
opposition. For hirn subjects are always capable of opposing the
whole merely by refusing to becomes vessels through which the whole
achieves i ts expression. Nonetheless, given Vere' s sense of closed
formal structures, the moment one offers such opposition one
relinquishes one's right to civilized protection. For Vere
subaltern opposition is a contradiction in terms because, by his
definition, a subaltern is one who does not oppose. By defending
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a closed, self-contained political system, Vere guarantees that the
only way in which the system will be transformed is through
dialectical opposition. In contrast, the synecdochal promise of
democracy encourages the attempts at self-representation that
Vere's authoritarian logic sees as threats to the system. As a
result, i t makes possible conditions for a system' s immanent
transformation through subaltern opposition.
If this way of describing the possibilities of subaltern
opposition within representative democracies makes them sound
preferable to systems in which an existing whole speaks through its
parts or a partibular part -- say a specific political party -- is
the only one allowed to speak for the whole, it does not license an
uncritical celebration of them. First of all, it says nothing
about how those who are not considered part of the body politic are
treated by such a system. As we have seen, representative
democracies can create possibilities of subaltern opposition for
their own subjects and be a terribly repressive force to people not
subject to their rule or even to those within their jurisdiction
hut denied citizenship, such as slaves or aliens.
Furthermore, they can be a force of repression when they deny
full citizenship and political rights to various sUbjects, whether
women or people under different forms of colonial rule. Indeed,
one advantage of the logical use of subaltern is that it helps to
articulate the difference between the possible political agency of
these with full rights in a representative demecracy and the
subaltern subjects of subaltern studies, for paradoxically enough,
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the latter's possibilities of transformative, subaltern opposition
are dramatically limited. Limited, but not necessarily completely
denied. For instance, as Ghandi acknowledged, the success of his
campaign of non-violent resistance depended in part on British
recognition of various rights of its colonial subjects.
Finally, to call attention to the transformative possibilities
of subaltern opposition for political sUbjects within
representative democracies is not uncritically to celebrate them
because the notion of the subaltern reminds us that any such
opposition assumes the prior existence of a set of governing
limitations. The concrete nature of those limitations needs to be
critically examined on a case by case basis. Indeed, to call
subjects within democracies subaltern is to call attention to the
discrepancy between the promise of full representation and actual
conditions of subordination. By the very logic of subaltern
opposition, those conditions can never be fully accounted for
through a description of political agency that confines itself
strictly to the political. Instead, any such description needs to
be supplemented by a consideration of a sUbject's total relation to
the culture of which it is apart. Thus, even though all citizens
are granted equal political rights, other considerations affect,
though never completely determine, their actual possibilities for
political representation. 30
I can illustrate how valuable the notion of subaltern
opposition can be for maintaining an internally critical stance
toward democratic societies by ending with a look at Philip
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Fisher ' s recent uncritical celebration of America' s democratic
culture.
V
Arguing for the inadequacy of ideological analysis in the
field of American studies, Fisher disputes one of the major
premises of ideological criticism growing out of Althusser. If
Althusser claims that a social formation maintains itself by
reproducing the conditions of production,31 Fisher claims that such
formulations do not apply to "a society whose commitment to self-
destruction in the name of its own next possibility is far more
important than its interest in the transfer of the forms of the
past to a future generation. ,,32 Not one of "those cultures of
preservation, inheritance, and self-reproduction that we tend to
take anthropologically as the human norm" (NAS xxii), America
undergoes permanent transformation. That transformation is
possible because American culture operates rhetorically not
ideologically. Constructing a problematic opposition, Fisher
asserts that ideology depends upon "a monopoly on representation"
(NAS viii) of the sort found in a monarchy, whereas rhetorics grow
out of a situation of competing strategies of representation, which
he calls a condition of civil wars. Because American culture is
characterized by "incomplete dominance of representation" (NAS xv) ,
it is a culture of permanent openness, one always in the process of
change. The force behind this change, Fisher asserts, is "economic
rather than religious or, in the anthropological sense, cultural"
(NAS xiv). Linking "democracy and capitalism," Fisher challenges
36
those who fail to recognize that both are "profound and humane,
exhilarating and enduring" (NAS xii).
One reason that they are enduring for Fisher is that he
believes that American culture works by containing the conflicting
claims to representation that power its transformations. It does
so by converting a civil war of representation between individual
parts into conflicts within an open-ended whole. Lacking a
definable essence, American culture allows for a perpetual
transformation of itself that feeds off of the opposing claims to
representation that constitute it.
There are numerous problems with Fisher's argument. E
Nonetheless, it does force me to supplement my earlier claim that
subaltern opposition can challenge the containment thesis by
offering transformative possibilities. After all, Fisher's
argument illustrates how perpetual transformation can become the
ultimate condition of containment. The conditions for
transformation are not all the same.
The differences between the transformative possibilities
allowed by subaltern opposition within a democratic political
system and those described by Fisher's conflation of democracy and
capitalism start to come into focus if we concentrate on how Fisher
perpetuates two confusions that I have already touched upon.
Fisher, we should note, does not assume essential identities or
natural givens. On the contrary, his pragmatic distrust of a given
human nature leads him to champion the openness of a culture of
self-destruction over those that conform to what he considers
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accepted anthropological norms. Indeed, in his version of the
nature vs. culture opposition, he asserts that the study of such a
culture "will always be historical not anthropological" (NAS xxii) .
What Fisher fails to recognize when he opposes history and
anthropology is that to deny human beings an essential nature is
still to make an anthropological claim. 34 To be sure, it is one
calling out for historical analysis (which is one reason why there
is a field of historical anthropology). But whereas Fisher claims
to privilege history over anthropology, he in fact risks an
ahistorical account of united states culture by assuming that it
has emancipated itself from the problematics of inheritance and
reproduction. Indeed, if he were less intent on proving the
economic role in creating the "preexisting social facts" of
"national life" (NAS xiv), he might recall how much the country's
democratic rhetoric appeals to founding political documents,
especially the Constitution. As Clinton's 1992 campaign
illustrated once again, that rhetoric is one of "renewal ," not
"self-destruction," an appeal to change based on the transference
of values from the past to a future generation. Despite Fisher's
neglect of it, that rhetoric lends itself to ideological analysis,
which is not to say that there are no positive possibilities within
it.
Fisher , however, is so fixated on denying that America' s
democratic culture has an ideology that he makes the outrageous
claim that the united states lacks astate. "In the absence of a
state we find ourselves freed of the intellectual component of the
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systematic state: ideology. We have rhetorics because we have no
ideology, and we have no ideology because we lack the apparatus of
ideology: a national religion, a unitary system of education under
the control of the state, a cultural life and media monopolized by
the state by means of either ownership or sUbsidy" (NAS xxii).
This capitalist fantasy of a free and open society existing without
the regulatory control of astate is part of Fisher's effort to
minimize the importance of the political in shaping democratic
culture. Defining the "sphere of the political" as the "sphere of
feIt opposition" (NAS xiv), he implies that a system that works by
converting "conflicts between" into "conflicts within" is one that
"has stood outside" a "regionalism" (NAS xiv) that he associates
with politics. 35
Based on a problematic opposition between anthropology and
history, Fisher's highly politicized claim to stand outside the
political also rests on a very limited view of the nature of
politics in the united states, which is not only a sphere of
dialectical opposition, but also one of subaltern opposition.
Holding out possibilities for transformation, the notion of
subaltern opposition also, as I have argued, draws attention to
persistent conditions of subordination. It allows us, for
instance, to question whether those participating within Fisher's
civil war within representation occupy equal positions in relation
to the whole of which they are apart or whether some begin the
battle with strategically superior positions. The notion of
subaltern opposition also allows members within a society capable
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of perpetual transformations to contemplate the effects of those
transformations on various wholes of which their society is apart,
such as the community of nations or "nature," effects that Fisher
doesn't even consider.
One reason that he doesn't is because, although he thinks that
he has offered a description of democratic culture, he in fact has
offered one of consumer capitalism. If Fisher is right to
challenge those who, without demonstration, assume that capitalism
and democracy are necessarily diametrically opposed, he is mistaken
when he fails to note distinctions between the two. To be sure,
the united states mixes democratic political institutions with
capitalist economic ones. But that mixture does not make
capitalism necessarily democratic.
To recall, subaltern opposition has a transformative
possibility in a democratic political system only when it holds out
the synecdochal promise of full representation. The problem with
maintaining that promise is that it leads to a crisis in
representation. Part of the exhilaration of the system that Fisher
describes is its promise to solve that crisis. If ideology
functions by restricting the terms of representation, Fisher's
system seems to leave the question of representation endlessly
open. But what seems to be a solution is simply an avoidance of
the problem altogether. Although Fisher talks about a civil war
within representation, his description in fact eliminates the
complicated problematics of representation. After all, a system
that has no interest in inheritance and reproduction has no need to
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re-present. Making no effort to re-present, what Fisher calls
representation is mere presentation, and the system that he
describes is an ahistorical one of perpetual presents. Abandoning
the logic of reproduction, it maintains itself by a mode of
production that depends on endless consumption. A vast self-
consuming artifact, it has already had profound effects on the
ecological system. To imagine a condition of endlessly open
(re)presentation is to avoid, not to address, situations of
subordination underscored by our present crisis in representation.
Nonetheless, it is little wonder that those studying
literature sense a crisis when confronted by the system described
by Fisher , for after all what possible use could it have for
literary history? Fisher's answer, it would seem, would have to be
the presentist position that the reading of past texts is not an
act of re-production or re-presentation, but simply the production
of a point of view in the present. It is not hard to find ways of
reading that oppose such presentism. They bring me to my final
application of the category of subaltern opposition.
If presentist readings result from readers consuming texts,
historical ones demand that readers submit to their governing
power. To be sure, a contrast between presentist and historical
readings can lead to a false opposition, especially if we assume,
as Trilling does, that a text has successfully contained a large
measure of the dialectic of i ts culture. Readers submitting to the
constraints of a subaltern relation to such a text seem to be
governed by a meaning that was fixed at a past moment of
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production. But insofar as a text exists in a subaltern, rather
than a synecdochal relation, to the culture that produced it, it is
not a self-contained, self-sufficient work. still governing the
responses of readers, such a text requires their labor to bring it
into representation. To be sure, those acts of representation
involve the production of points of view in the present. But they
do not follow consumer capitalism's logic of self-destructive
production. Whereas their effects cannot be predicted in advance,
they have the potential, not only to indicate ways in which our
present crisis in representation is influenced by constraints
inherited from the past, but also to present unrealized
possibilities from the past that have not yet been laid to rest.
If literary critics are mistaken when they allow their readings to
represent an entire culture, subaltern readings can continue to
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